diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c | 130 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/arm64/kernel/process.c | 1 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c | 33 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/misc/lkdtm/bugs.c | 53 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | tools/testing/selftests/lkdtm/tests.txt | 2 |
5 files changed, 92 insertions, 127 deletions
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c index c154f72634e0..9de1d8a604cb 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c @@ -180,13 +180,6 @@ static inline void set_sve_default_vl(int val) set_default_vl(ARM64_VEC_SVE, val); } -static u8 *efi_sve_state; - -#else /* ! CONFIG_ARM64_SVE */ - -/* Dummy declaration for code that will be optimised out: */ -extern u8 *efi_sve_state; - #endif /* ! CONFIG_ARM64_SVE */ #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_SME @@ -1095,36 +1088,6 @@ int vec_verify_vq_map(enum vec_type type) return 0; } -static void __init sve_efi_setup(void) -{ - int max_vl = 0; - int i; - - if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI)) - return; - - for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(vl_info); i++) - max_vl = max(vl_info[i].max_vl, max_vl); - - /* - * alloc_percpu() warns and prints a backtrace if this goes wrong. - * This is evidence of a crippled system and we are returning void, - * so no attempt is made to handle this situation here. - */ - if (!sve_vl_valid(max_vl)) - goto fail; - - efi_sve_state = kmalloc(SVE_SIG_REGS_SIZE(sve_vq_from_vl(max_vl)), - GFP_KERNEL); - if (!efi_sve_state) - goto fail; - - return; - -fail: - panic("Cannot allocate memory for EFI SVE save/restore"); -} - void cpu_enable_sve(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__always_unused p) { write_sysreg(read_sysreg(CPACR_EL1) | CPACR_EL1_ZEN_EL1EN, CPACR_EL1); @@ -1185,8 +1148,6 @@ void __init sve_setup(void) if (sve_max_virtualisable_vl() < sve_max_vl()) pr_warn("%s: unvirtualisable vector lengths present\n", info->name); - - sve_efi_setup(); } /* @@ -1947,9 +1908,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_neon_end); #ifdef CONFIG_EFI static struct user_fpsimd_state efi_fpsimd_state; -static bool efi_fpsimd_state_used; -static bool efi_sve_state_used; -static bool efi_sm_state; /* * EFI runtime services support functions @@ -1976,43 +1934,26 @@ void __efi_fpsimd_begin(void) if (may_use_simd()) { kernel_neon_begin(&efi_fpsimd_state); } else { - WARN_ON(preemptible()); - /* - * If !efi_sve_state, SVE can't be in use yet and doesn't need - * preserving: + * We are running in hardirq or NMI context, and the only + * legitimate case where this might happen is when EFI pstore + * is attempting to record the system's dying gasps into EFI + * variables. This could be due to an oops, a panic or a call + * to emergency_restart(), and in none of those cases, we can + * expect the current task to ever return to user space again, + * or for the kernel to resume any normal execution, for that + * matter (an oops in hardirq context triggers a panic too). + * + * Therefore, there is no point in attempting to preserve any + * SVE/SME state here. On the off chance that we might have + * ended up here for a different reason inadvertently, kill the + * task and preserve/restore the base FP/SIMD state, which + * might belong to kernel mode FP/SIMD. */ - if (system_supports_sve() && efi_sve_state != NULL) { - bool ffr = true; - u64 svcr; - - efi_sve_state_used = true; - - if (system_supports_sme()) { - svcr = read_sysreg_s(SYS_SVCR); - - efi_sm_state = svcr & SVCR_SM_MASK; - - /* - * Unless we have FA64 FFR does not - * exist in streaming mode. - */ - if (!system_supports_fa64()) - ffr = !(svcr & SVCR_SM_MASK); - } - - sve_save_state(efi_sve_state + sve_ffr_offset(sve_max_vl()), - &efi_fpsimd_state.fpsr, ffr); - - if (system_supports_sme()) - sysreg_clear_set_s(SYS_SVCR, - SVCR_SM_MASK, 0); - - } else { - fpsimd_save_state(&efi_fpsimd_state); - } - - efi_fpsimd_state_used = true; + pr_warn_ratelimited("Calling EFI runtime from %s context\n", + in_nmi() ? "NMI" : "hardirq"); + force_signal_inject(SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, 0, 0); + fpsimd_save_state(&efi_fpsimd_state); } } @@ -2024,41 +1965,10 @@ void __efi_fpsimd_end(void) if (!system_supports_fpsimd()) return; - if (!efi_fpsimd_state_used) { + if (may_use_simd()) { kernel_neon_end(&efi_fpsimd_state); } else { - if (system_supports_sve() && efi_sve_state_used) { - bool ffr = true; - - /* - * Restore streaming mode; EFI calls are - * normal function calls so should not return in - * streaming mode. - */ - if (system_supports_sme()) { - if (efi_sm_state) { - sysreg_clear_set_s(SYS_SVCR, - 0, - SVCR_SM_MASK); - - /* - * Unless we have FA64 FFR does not - * exist in streaming mode. - */ - if (!system_supports_fa64()) - ffr = false; - } - } - - sve_load_state(efi_sve_state + sve_ffr_offset(sve_max_vl()), - &efi_fpsimd_state.fpsr, ffr); - - efi_sve_state_used = false; - } else { - fpsimd_load_state(&efi_fpsimd_state); - } - - efi_fpsimd_state_used = false; + fpsimd_load_state(&efi_fpsimd_state); } } diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c index fba7ca102a8c..489554931231 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c @@ -292,6 +292,7 @@ static void flush_gcs(void) current->thread.gcs_base = 0; current->thread.gcs_size = 0; current->thread.gcs_el0_mode = 0; + current->thread.gcs_el0_locked = 0; write_sysreg_s(GCSCRE0_EL1_nTR, SYS_GCSCRE0_EL1); write_sysreg_s(0, SYS_GCSPR_EL0); } diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c b/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c index 9ae7ce00a7ef..8e1d80a7033e 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c +++ b/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c @@ -767,18 +767,6 @@ static inline bool force_pte_mapping(void) return rodata_full || arm64_kfence_can_set_direct_map() || is_realm_world(); } -static inline bool split_leaf_mapping_possible(void) -{ - /* - * !BBML2_NOABORT systems should never run into scenarios where we would - * have to split. So exit early and let calling code detect it and raise - * a warning. - */ - if (!system_supports_bbml2_noabort()) - return false; - return !force_pte_mapping(); -} - static DEFINE_MUTEX(pgtable_split_lock); int split_kernel_leaf_mapping(unsigned long start, unsigned long end) @@ -786,11 +774,22 @@ int split_kernel_leaf_mapping(unsigned long start, unsigned long end) int ret; /* - * Exit early if the region is within a pte-mapped area or if we can't - * split. For the latter case, the permission change code will raise a - * warning if not already pte-mapped. + * !BBML2_NOABORT systems should not be trying to change permissions on + * anything that is not pte-mapped in the first place. Just return early + * and let the permission change code raise a warning if not already + * pte-mapped. */ - if (!split_leaf_mapping_possible() || is_kfence_address((void *)start)) + if (!system_supports_bbml2_noabort()) + return 0; + + /* + * If the region is within a pte-mapped area, there is no need to try to + * split. Additionally, CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC and CONFIG_KFENCE may + * change permissions from atomic context so for those cases (which are + * always pte-mapped), we must not go any further because taking the + * mutex below may sleep. + */ + if (force_pte_mapping() || is_kfence_address((void *)start)) return 0; /* @@ -1089,7 +1088,7 @@ bool arch_kfence_init_pool(void) int ret; /* Exit early if we know the linear map is already pte-mapped. */ - if (!split_leaf_mapping_possible()) + if (force_pte_mapping()) return true; /* Kfence pool is already pte-mapped for the early init case. */ diff --git a/drivers/misc/lkdtm/bugs.c b/drivers/misc/lkdtm/bugs.c index 376047beea3d..502059078b45 100644 --- a/drivers/misc/lkdtm/bugs.c +++ b/drivers/misc/lkdtm/bugs.c @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ #include "lkdtm.h" #include <linux/cpu.h> #include <linux/list.h> +#include <linux/hrtimer.h> #include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/sched/signal.h> #include <linux/sched/task_stack.h> @@ -100,11 +101,61 @@ static void lkdtm_PANIC_STOP_IRQOFF(void) stop_machine(panic_stop_irqoff_fn, &v, cpu_online_mask); } +static bool wait_for_panic; + +static enum hrtimer_restart panic_in_hardirq(struct hrtimer *timer) +{ + panic("from hard IRQ context"); + + wait_for_panic = false; + return HRTIMER_NORESTART; +} + +static void lkdtm_PANIC_IN_HARDIRQ(void) +{ + struct hrtimer timer; + + wait_for_panic = true; + hrtimer_setup_on_stack(&timer, panic_in_hardirq, + CLOCK_MONOTONIC, HRTIMER_MODE_REL_HARD); + hrtimer_start(&timer, us_to_ktime(100), HRTIMER_MODE_REL_HARD); + + while (READ_ONCE(wait_for_panic)) + cpu_relax(); + + hrtimer_cancel(&timer); +} + static void lkdtm_BUG(void) { BUG(); } +static bool wait_for_bug; + +static enum hrtimer_restart bug_in_hardirq(struct hrtimer *timer) +{ + BUG(); + + wait_for_bug = false; + return HRTIMER_NORESTART; +} + +static void lkdtm_BUG_IN_HARDIRQ(void) +{ + struct hrtimer timer; + + wait_for_bug = true; + hrtimer_setup_on_stack(&timer, bug_in_hardirq, + CLOCK_MONOTONIC, HRTIMER_MODE_REL_HARD); + hrtimer_start(&timer, us_to_ktime(100), HRTIMER_MODE_REL_HARD); + + while (READ_ONCE(wait_for_bug)) + cpu_relax(); + + hrtimer_cancel(&timer); +} + static int warn_counter; static void lkdtm_WARNING(void) @@ -696,7 +747,9 @@ static noinline void lkdtm_CORRUPT_PAC(void) static struct crashtype crashtypes[] = { CRASHTYPE(PANIC), CRASHTYPE(PANIC_STOP_IRQOFF), + CRASHTYPE(PANIC_IN_HARDIRQ), CRASHTYPE(BUG), + CRASHTYPE(BUG_IN_HARDIRQ), CRASHTYPE(WARNING), CRASHTYPE(WARNING_MESSAGE), CRASHTYPE(EXCEPTION), diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/lkdtm/tests.txt b/tools/testing/selftests/lkdtm/tests.txt index cff124c1eddd..67cd53715d93 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/lkdtm/tests.txt +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/lkdtm/tests.txt @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ #PANIC #PANIC_STOP_IRQOFF Crashes entire system +#PANIC_IN_HARDIRQ Crashes entire system BUG kernel BUG at +#BUG_IN_HARDIRQ Crashes entire system WARNING WARNING: WARNING_MESSAGE message trigger EXCEPTION |
