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A LASS violation typically results in a #GP. With LASS active, any
invalid access to user memory (including the first page frame) would be
reported as a #GP, instead of a #PF.
Unfortunately, the #GP error messages provide limited information about
the cause of the fault. This could be confusing for kernel developers
and users who are accustomed to the friendly #PF messages.
To make the transition easier, enhance the #GP Oops message to include a
hint about LASS violations. Also, add a special hint for kernel NULL
pointer dereferences to match with the existing #PF message.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251118182911.2983253-7-sohil.mehta%40intel.com
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The relocate kernel mechanism uses an identity mapping to copy the new
kernel, which leads to a LASS violation when executing from a low
address.
LASS must be disabled after the original CR4 value is saved because
kexec paths that preserve context need to restore CR4.LASS. But,
disabling it along with CET during identity_mapped() is too late. So,
disable LASS immediately after saving CR4, along with PGE, and before
jumping to the identity-mapped page.
Signed-off-by: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251118182911.2983253-6-sohil.mehta%40intel.com
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For patching, the kernel initializes a temporary mm area in the lower
half of the address range. LASS blocks these accesses because its
enforcement relies on bit 63 of the virtual address as opposed to SMAP
which depends on the _PAGE_BIT_USER bit in the page table. Disable LASS
enforcement by toggling the RFLAGS.AC bit during patching to avoid
triggering a #GP fault.
Introduce LASS-specific STAC/CLAC helpers to set the AC bit only on
platforms that need it. Name the wrappers as lass_stac()/_clac() instead
of lass_disable()/_enable() because they only control the kernel data
access enforcement. The entire LASS mechanism (including instruction
fetch enforcement) is controlled by the CR4.LASS bit.
Describe the usage of the new helpers in comparison to the ones used for
SMAP. Also, add comments to explain when the existing stac()/clac()
should be used. While at it, move the duplicated "barrier" comment to
the same block.
The Text poking functions use standard memcpy()/memset() while patching
kernel code. However, objtool complains about calling such dynamic
functions within an AC=1 region. See warning #9, regarding function
calls with UACCESS enabled, in tools/objtool/Documentation/objtool.txt.
To pacify objtool, one option is to add memcpy() and memset() to the
list of allowed-functions. However, that would provide a blanket
exemption for all usages of memcpy() and memset(). Instead, replace the
standard calls in the text poking functions with their unoptimized,
always-inlined versions. Considering that patching is usually small,
there is no performance impact expected.
Signed-off-by: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251118182911.2983253-5-sohil.mehta%40intel.com
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With LASS enabled, any kernel data access to userspace typically results
in a #GP, or a #SS in some stack-related cases. When the kernel needs to
access user memory, it can suspend LASS enforcement by toggling the
RFLAGS.AC bit. Most of these cases are already covered by the
stac()/clac() pairs used to avoid SMAP violations.
Even though LASS could potentially be enabled independently, it would be
very painful without SMAP and the related stac()/clac() calls. There is
no reason to support such a configuration because all future hardware
with LASS is expected to have SMAP as well. Also, the STAC/CLAC
instructions are architected to:
#UD - If CPUID.(EAX=07H, ECX=0H):EBX.SMAP[bit 20] = 0.
So, make LASS depend on SMAP to conveniently reuse the existing AC bit
toggling already in place.
Note: Additional STAC/CLAC would still be needed for accesses such as
text poking which are not flagged by SMAP. This is because such mappings
are in the lower half but do not have the _PAGE_USER bit set which SMAP
uses for enforcement.
Signed-off-by: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251118182911.2983253-3-sohil.mehta%40intel.com
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mm_get_unmapped_area() is a wrapper around arch_get_unmapped_area() /
arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown(), both of which search current->mm for
some free space. Neither take an mm_struct - they implicitly operate on
current->mm.
But the wrapper takes an mm_struct and uses it to decide whether to search
bottom up or top down. All callers pass in current->mm for this, so
everything is working consistently. But it feels like an accident waiting
to happen; eventually someone will call that function with a different mm,
expecting to find free space in it, but what gets returned is free space
in the current mm.
So let's simplify by removing the parameter and have the wrapper use
current->mm to decide which end to start at. Now everything is consistent
and self-documenting.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20251003155306.2147572-1-ryan.roberts@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Dev Jain <dev.jain@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Baolin Wang <baolin.wang@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Liam Howlett <liam.howlett@oracle.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 fixes from Ingo Molnar:
- Update the list of AMD microcode minimum Entrysign revisions
- Add additional fixed AMD RDSEED microcode revisions
- Update the language transliteration for Kiryl Shutsemau's name
in the MAINTAINERS entry
* tag 'x86-urgent-2025-11-15' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/microcode/AMD: Add Zen5 model 0x44, stepping 0x1 minrev
x86/CPU/AMD: Add additional fixed RDSEED microcode revisions
MAINTAINERS: Update name spelling
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Rename hv_machine_crash_shutdown to more appropriate
hv_guest_crash_shutdown and make it applicable to guests only. This
in preparation for the subsequent hypervisor root crash support
patches.
Signed-off-by: Mukesh Rathor <mrathor@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
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./arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c: asm/msr.h is included more than once.
Reported-by: Abaci Robot <abaci@linux.alibaba.com>
Closes: https://bugzilla.openanolis.cn/show_bug.cgi?id=26164
Signed-off-by: Jiapeng Chong <jiapeng.chong@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
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hv_set_non_nested_msr() has special handling for SINT MSRs
when a paravisor is present. In addition to updating the MSR on the
host, the mirror MSR in the paravisor is updated, including with the
proxy bit. But with Confidential VMBus, the proxy bit must not be
used, so add a special case to skip it.
Signed-off-by: Roman Kisel <romank@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Alok Tiwari <alok.a.tiwari@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tianyu Lan <tiala@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael Kelley <mhklinux@outlook.com>
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
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The existing Hyper-V wrappers for getting and setting MSRs are
hv_get/set_msr(). Via hv_get/set_non_nested_msr(), they detect
when running in a CoCo VM with a paravisor, and use the TDX or
SNP guest-host communication protocol to bypass the paravisor
and go directly to the host hypervisor for SynIC MSRs. The "set"
function also implements the required special handling for the
SINT MSRs.
Provide functions that allow manipulating the SynIC registers
through the paravisor. Move vmbus_signal_eom() to a more
appropriate location (which also avoids breaking KVM).
Signed-off-by: Roman Kisel <romank@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Alok Tiwari <alok.a.tiwari@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael Kelley <mhklinux@outlook.com>
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
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Confidential VMBus requires enabling paravisor SynIC, and
the x86_64 guest has to inspect the Virtualization Stack (VS)
CPUID leaf to see if Confidential VMBus is available. If it is,
the guest shall enable the paravisor SynIC.
Read the relevant data from the VS CPUID leaf. Refactor the
code to avoid repeating CPUID and add flags to the struct
ms_hyperv_info. For ARM64, the flag for Confidential VMBus
is not set which provides the desired behaviour for now as
it is not available on ARM64 just yet. Once ARM64 CCA guests
are supported, this flag will be set unconditionally when
running such a guest.
Signed-off-by: Roman Kisel <romank@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael Kelley <mhklinux@outlook.com>
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
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Hyper-V doesn't support auto-eoi with Secure AVIC.
So set the HV_DEPRECATING_AEOI_RECOMMENDED flag
to force writing the EOI register after handling an interrupt.
Reviewed-by: Michael Kelley <mhklinux@outlook.com>
Reviewed-by: Neeraj Upadhyay <Neeraj.Upadhyay@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Tianyu Lan <tiala@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
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Pull bpf fixes from Alexei Starovoitov:
- Fix interaction between livepatch and BPF fexit programs (Song Liu)
With Steven and Masami acks.
- Fix stack ORC unwind from BPF kprobe_multi (Jiri Olsa)
With Steven and Masami acks.
- Fix out of bounds access in widen_imprecise_scalars() in the verifier
(Eduard Zingerman)
- Fix conflicts between MPTCP and BPF sockmap (Jiayuan Chen)
- Fix net_sched storage collision with BPF data_meta/data_end (Eric
Dumazet)
- Add _impl suffix to BPF kfuncs with implicit args to avoid breaking
them in bpf-next when KF_IMPLICIT_ARGS is added (Mykyta Yatsenko)
* tag 'bpf-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf:
selftests/bpf: Test widen_imprecise_scalars() with different stack depth
bpf: account for current allocated stack depth in widen_imprecise_scalars()
bpf: Add bpf_prog_run_data_pointers()
selftests/bpf: Add mptcp test with sockmap
mptcp: Fix proto fallback detection with BPF
mptcp: Disallow MPTCP subflows from sockmap
selftests/bpf: Add stacktrace ips test for raw_tp
selftests/bpf: Add stacktrace ips test for kprobe_multi/kretprobe_multi
x86/fgraph,bpf: Fix stack ORC unwind from kprobe_multi return probe
Revert "perf/x86: Always store regs->ip in perf_callchain_kernel()"
bpf: add _impl suffix for bpf_stream_vprintk() kfunc
bpf:add _impl suffix for bpf_task_work_schedule* kfuncs
selftests/bpf: Add tests for livepatch + bpf trampoline
ftrace: bpf: Fix IPMODIFY + DIRECT in modify_ftrace_direct()
ftrace: Fix BPF fexit with livepatch
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Get rid of the forward declarations of the mitigation functions by
moving their single caller below them.
No functional changes.
Suggested-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251105200447.GBaQut3w4dLilZrX-z@fat_crate.local
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Add the minimum Entrysign revision for that model+stepping to the list
of minimum revisions.
Fixes: 50cef76d5cb0 ("x86/microcode/AMD: Load only SHA256-checksummed patches")
Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/e94dd76b-4911-482f-8500-5c848a3df026@citrix.com
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Microcode that resolves the RDSEED failure (SB-7055 [1]) has been released for
additional Zen5 models to linux-firmware [2]. Update the zen5_rdseed_microcode
array to cover these new models.
Fixes: 607b9fb2ce24 ("x86/CPU/AMD: Add RDSEED fix for Zen5")
Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Link: https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security/bulletin/amd-sb-7055.html [1]
Link: https://gitlab.com/kernel-firmware/linux-firmware/-/commit/6167e5566900cf236f7a69704e8f4c441bc7212a [2]
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251113223608.1495655-1-mario.limonciello@amd.com
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Several drivers can benefit from registering per-instance data along
with the syscore operations. To achieve this, move the modifiable fields
out of the syscore_ops structure and into a separate struct syscore that
can be registered with the framework. Add a void * driver data field for
drivers to store contextual data that will be passed to the syscore ops.
Acked-by: Rafael J. Wysocki (Intel) <rafael@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thierry Reding <treding@nvidia.com>
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Merge ACPI CPPC library fixes and an ACPI MRRM table parser fix for
6.18-rc6.
* acpi-cppc:
ACPI: CPPC: Limit perf ctrs in PCC check only to online CPUs
ACPI: CPPC: Perform fast check switch only for online CPUs
ACPI: CPPC: Check _CPC validity for only the online CPUs
ACPI: CPPC: Detect preferred core availability on online CPUs
* acpi-tables:
ACPI: MRRM: Fix memory leaks and improve error handling
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Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Extend KVM's export macro framework to provide EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM(),
and use the helper macro to export symbols for KVM throughout x86 if and
only if KVM will build one or more modules, and only for those modules.
To avoid unnecessary exports when CONFIG_KVM=m but kvm.ko will not be
built (because no vendor modules are selected), let arch code #define
EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM to suppress/override the exports.
Note, the set of symbols to restrict to KVM was generated by manual search
and audit; any "misses" are due to human error, not some grand plan.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Tested-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251112173944.1380633-5-seanjc%40google.com
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Don't export "mtrr_state" as usage is limited to arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr
(and nothing outside of that directory even includes the local mtrr.h).
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251112173944.1380633-3-seanjc%40google.com
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Don't export x86_spec_ctrl_base as it's used only in bugs.c and process.c,
neither of which can be built into a module.
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251112173944.1380633-2-seanjc%40google.com
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 fixes from Ingo Molnar:
- Fix AMD PCI root device caching regression that triggers
on certain firmware variants
- Fix the zen5_rdseed_microcode[] array to be NULL-terminated
- Add more AMD models to microcode signature checking
* tag 'x86-urgent-2025-11-08' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/microcode/AMD: Add more known models to entry sign checking
x86/CPU/AMD: Add missing terminator for zen5_rdseed_microcode
x86/amd_node: Fix AMD root device caching
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Commit 279f838a61f9 ("x86/amd: Detect preferred cores in
amd_get_boost_ratio_numerator()") introduced the ability to detect the
preferred core on AMD platforms by checking if there at least two
distinct highest_perf values.
However, it uses for_each_present_cpu() to iterate through all the
CPUs in the platform, which is problematic when the kernel is booted
with "nosmt=force" commandline option.
Hence limit the search to only the online CPUs.
Fixes: 279f838a61f9 ("x86/amd: Detect preferred cores in amd_get_boost_ratio_numerator()")
Reported-by: Christopher Harris <chris.harris79@gmail.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAM+eXpdDT7KjLV0AxEwOLkSJ2QtrsvGvjA2cCHvt1d0k2_C4Cw@mail.gmail.com/
Reviewed-by: "Mario Limonciello (AMD) (kernel.org)" <superm1@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Chrisopher Harris <chris.harris79@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Gautham R. Shenoy <gautham.shenoy@amd.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251107074145.2340-2-gautham.shenoy@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
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When apic=verbose is specified, the LAPIC timer calibration prints its results
to the console. At least while debugging virtualization code, the CPU and bus
frequencies are printed incorrectly.
Specifically, for a 1.7 GHz CPU with 1 GHz bus frequency and HZ=1000,
the log includes a superfluous 0 after the period:
..... calibration result: 999978
..... CPU clock speed is 1696.0783 MHz.
..... host bus clock speed is 999.0978 MHz.
Looking at the code, this only worked as intended for HZ=100. After the fix,
the correct frequency is printed:
..... calibration result: 999828
..... CPU clock speed is 1696.507 MHz.
..... host bus clock speed is 999.828 MHz.
There is no functional change to the LAPIC calibration here, beyond the
printing format changes.
[ bp: - Massage commit message
- Figures it should apply this patch about ~4 years later
- Massage it into the current code ]
Suggested-by: Markus Napierkowski <markus.napierkowski@cyberus-technology.de>
Signed-off-by: Julian Stecklina <julian.stecklina@cyberus-technology.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20211030142148.143261-1-js@alien8.de
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Two Zen5 systems are missing from need_sha_check(). Add them.
Fixes: 50cef76d5cb0 ("x86/microcode/AMD: Load only SHA256-checksummed patches")
Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello (AMD) <superm1@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251106182904.4143757-1-superm1@kernel.org
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Currently we don't get stack trace via ORC unwinder on top of fgraph exit
handler. We can see that when generating stacktrace from kretprobe_multi
bpf program which is based on fprobe/fgraph.
The reason is that the ORC unwind code won't get pass the return_to_handler
callback installed by fgraph return probe machinery.
Solving this by creating stack frame in return_to_handler expected by
ftrace_graph_ret_addr function to recover original return address and
continue with the unwind.
Also updating the pt_regs data with cs/flags/rsp which are needed for
successful stack retrieval from ebpf bpf_get_stackid helper.
- in get_perf_callchain we check user_mode(regs) so CS has to be set
- in perf_callchain_kernel we call perf_hw_regs(regs), so EFLAGS/FIXED
has to be unset
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251104215405.168643-3-jolsa@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
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Prepare for CMCI storm support by moving the common bank/block iterator code
to a helper function.
Include a parameter to switch the interrupt enable. This will be used by the
CMCI storm handling function.
Signed-off-by: Yazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20251104-wip-mca-updates-v8-0-66c8eacf67b9@amd.com
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Many of the checks in reset_block() are done again in the block reset
function. So drop the redundant checks.
Signed-off-by: Yazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20251104-wip-mca-updates-v8-0-66c8eacf67b9@amd.com
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AMD systems optionally support MCA thresholding which provides the ability for
hardware to send an interrupt when a set error threshold is reached. This
feature counts errors of all severities, but it is commonly used to report
correctable errors with an interrupt rather than polling.
Scalable MCA systems allow the platform to take control of this feature. In
this case, the OS will not see the feature configuration and control bits in
the MCA_MISC* registers. The OS will not receive the MCA thresholding
interrupt, and it will need to poll for correctable errors.
A "corrected error interrupt" will be available on Scalable MCA systems. This
will be used in the same configuration where the platform controls MCA
thresholding. However, the platform will now be able to send the MCA
thresholding interrupt to the OS.
Check for, and enable, this feature during per-CPU SMCA init.
Signed-off-by: Yazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Tested-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20251104-wip-mca-updates-v8-0-66c8eacf67b9@amd.com
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Scalable MCA systems have a per-CPU register that gives the APIC LVT offset
for the thresholding and deferred error interrupts.
Currently, this register is read once to set up the deferred error interrupt
and then read again for each thresholding block. Furthermore, the APIC LVT
registers are configured each time, but they only need to be configured once
per-CPU.
Move the APIC LVT setup to the early part of CPU init, so that the registers
are set up once. Also, this ensures that the kernel is ready to service the
interrupts before the individual error sources (each MCA bank) are enabled.
Apply this change only to SMCA systems to avoid breaking any legacy behavior.
The deferred error interrupt is technically advertised by the SUCCOR feature.
However, this was first made available on SMCA systems. Therefore, only set
up the deferred error interrupt on SMCA systems and simplify the code.
Guidance from hardware designers is that the LVT offsets provided from the
platform should be used. The kernel should not try to enforce specific values.
However, the kernel should check that an LVT offset is not reused for multiple
sources.
Therefore, remove the extra checking and value enforcement from the MCE code.
The "reuse/conflict" case is already handled in setup_APIC_eilvt().
Signed-off-by: Yazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Tested-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20251104-wip-mca-updates-v8-0-66c8eacf67b9@amd.com
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AMD systems optionally support a deferred error interrupt. The interrupt
should be used as another signal to trigger MCA polling. This is similar to
how other MCA interrupts are handled.
Deferred errors do not require any special handling related to the interrupt,
e.g. resetting or rearming the interrupt, etc.
However, Scalable MCA systems include a pair of registers, MCA_DESTAT and
MCA_DEADDR, that should be checked for valid errors. This check should be done
whenever MCA registers are polled. Currently, the deferred error interrupt
does this check, but the MCA polling function does not.
Call the MCA polling function when handling the deferred error interrupt. This
keeps all "polling" cases in a common function.
Add an SMCA status check helper. This will do the same status check and
register clearing that the interrupt handler has done. And it extends the
common polling flow to find AMD deferred errors.
Clear the MCA_DESTAT register at the end of the handler rather than the
beginning. This maintains the procedure that the 'status' register must be
cleared as the final step.
Signed-off-by: Yazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20251104-wip-mca-updates-v8-0-66c8eacf67b9@amd.com
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AMD systems optionally support an MCA thresholding interrupt. The interrupt
should be used as another signal to trigger MCA polling. This is similar to
how the Intel Corrected Machine Check interrupt (CMCI) is handled.
AMD MCA thresholding is managed using the MCA_MISC registers within an MCA
bank. The OS will need to modify the hardware error count field in order to
reset the threshold limit and rearm the interrupt. Management of the MCA_MISC
register should be done as a follow up to the basic MCA polling flow. It
should not be the main focus of the interrupt handler.
Furthermore, future systems will have the ability to send an MCA thresholding
interrupt to the OS even when the OS does not manage the feature, i.e.
MCA_MISC registers are Read-as-Zero/Locked.
Call the common MCA polling function when handling the MCA thresholding
interrupt. This will allow the OS to find any valid errors whether or not the
MCA thresholding feature is OS-managed. Also, this allows the common MCA
polling options and kernel parameters to apply to AMD systems.
Add a callback to the MCA polling function to check and reset any threshold
blocks that have reached their threshold limit.
Signed-off-by: Yazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20251104-wip-mca-updates-v8-0-66c8eacf67b9@amd.com
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While restricting access,
a7e1f67ed29f ("x86/msr: Filter MSR writes")
also added warning and started tainting the kernel.
But the warning message never mentioned tainting. Moreover, this uses the
"CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC" flag which is not clearly related to MSRs: that flag is
overloaded by several, fairly different situations, including some much
scarier ones.
So, without an expert around (thank you Dave Hansen), it would have been
practically impossible to root cause the tainting from just the log file at
hand. So it would be prudent to explicitly mention in the logs when the
tainting happens so that debugging crashes can be made easier.
Fix this by simply appending the CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC flag to the warning message.
This readability issue happened when staring at logs involving the Intel
Memory Latency Checker (among many other things going on in that log). The MLC
disables hardware prefetch.
[ bp: Massage and extend commit message. ]
Signed-off-by: Marc Herbert <marc.herbert@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251101-tainted-msr-v1-1-e00658ba04d4@linux.intel.com
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The runtime-const infrastructure was never designed to handle the
modular case, because the constant fixup is only done at boot time for
core kernel code.
But by the time I used it for the x86-64 user space limit handling in
commit 86e6b1547b3d ("x86: fix user address masking non-canonical
speculation issue"), I had completely repressed that fact.
And it all happens to work because the only code that currently actually
gets inlined by modules is for the access_ok() limit check, where the
default constant value works even when not fixed up. Because at least I
had intentionally made it be something that is in the non-canonical
address space region.
But it's technically very wrong, and it does mean that at least in
theory, the use of 'access_ok()' + '__get_user()' can trigger the same
speculation issue with non-canonical addresses that the original commit
was all about.
The pattern is unusual enough that this probably doesn't matter in
practice, but very wrong is still very wrong. Also, let's fix it before
the nice optimized scoped user accessor helpers that Thomas Gleixner is
working on cause this pseudo-constant to then be more widely used.
This all came up due to an unrelated discussion with Mateusz Guzik about
using the runtime const infrastructure for names_cachep accesses too.
There the modular case was much more obviously broken, and Mateusz noted
it in his 'v2' of the patch series.
That then made me notice how broken 'access_ok()' had been in modules
all along. Mea culpa, mea maxima culpa.
Fix it by simply not using the runtime-const code in modules, and just
using the USER_PTR_MAX variable value instead. This is not
performance-critical like the core user accessor functions (get_user()
and friends) are.
Also make sure this doesn't get forgotten the next time somebody wants
to do runtime constant optimizations by having the x86 runtime-const.h
header file error out if included by modules.
Fixes: 86e6b1547b3d ("x86: fix user address masking non-canonical speculation issue")
Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Acked-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Triggered-by: Mateusz Guzik <mjguzik@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251030105242.801528-1-mjguzik@gmail.com/
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Running x86_match_min_microcode_rev() on a Zen5 CPU trips up KASAN for an out
of bounds access.
Fixes: 607b9fb2ce248 ("x86/CPU/AMD: Add RDSEED fix for Zen5")
Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251104161007.269885-1-mario.limonciello@amd.com
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Recent AMD node rework removed the "search and count" method of caching AMD
root devices. This depended on the value from a Data Fabric register that was
expected to hold the PCI bus of one of the root devices attached to that
fabric.
However, this expectation is incorrect. The register, when read from PCI
config space, returns the bitwise-OR of the buses of all attached root
devices.
This behavior is benign on AMD reference design boards, since the bus numbers
are aligned. This results in a bitwise-OR value matching one of the buses. For
example, 0x00 | 0x40 | 0xA0 | 0xE0 = 0xE0.
This behavior breaks on boards where the bus numbers are not exactly aligned.
For example, 0x00 | 0x07 | 0xE0 | 0x15 = 0x1F.
The examples above are for AMD node 0. The first root device on other nodes
will not be 0x00. The first root device for other nodes will depend on the
total number of root devices, the system topology, and the specific PCI bus
number assignment.
For example, a system with 2 AMD nodes could have this:
Node 0 : 0x00 0x07 0x0e 0x15
Node 1 : 0x1c 0x23 0x2a 0x31
The bus numbering style in the reference boards is not a requirement. The
numbering found in other boards is not incorrect. Therefore, the root device
caching method needs to be adjusted.
Go back to the "search and count" method used before the recent rework.
Search for root devices using PCI class code rather than fixed PCI IDs.
This keeps the goal of the rework (remove dependency on PCI IDs) while being
able to support various board designs.
Merge helper functions to reduce code duplication.
[ bp: Reflow comment. ]
Fixes: 40a5f6ffdfc8 ("x86/amd_nb: Simplify root device search")
Signed-off-by: Yazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/all/20251028-fix-amd-root-v2-1-843e38f8be2c@amd.com
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native_play_dead() ends by calling the non-returning function
hlt_play_dead() and therefore also never returns.
The !CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU stub version of native_play_dead()
unconditionally calls BUG() and does not return either.
Add the __noreturn attribute to both function definitions and their
declaration to document this behavior and to potentially improve
compiler optimizations.
Remove the obsolete comment, and add native_play_dead() to the objtool's
list of __noreturn functions.
Signed-off-by: Thorsten Blum <thorsten.blum@linux.dev>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251027155107.183136-1-thorsten.blum@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
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Fix section mismatch warning reported by modpost:
.text:early_parse_cmdline() -> .init.data:boot_command_line
The function early_parse_cmdline() is only called during init and accesses
init data, so mark it __init to match its usage.
[ bp: This happens only when the toolchain fails to inline the function and
I haven't been able to reproduce it with any toolchain I'm using. Patch is
obviously correct regardless. ]
Signed-off-by: Yu Peng <pengyu@kylinos.cn>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/all/20251030123757.1410904-1-pengyu@kylinos.cn
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All microcode patches up to the proper BIOS Entrysign fix are loaded
only after the sha256 signature carried in the driver has been verified.
Microcode patches after the Entrysign fix has been applied, do not need
that signature verification anymore.
In order to not abandon machines which haven't received the BIOS update
yet, add the capability to select which microcode patch to load.
The corresponding microcode container supplied through firmware-linux
has been modified to carry two patches per CPU type
(family/model/stepping) so that the proper one gets selected.
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Tested-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251027133818.4363-1-bp@kernel.org
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Add some more Zen6 models.
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251029123056.19987-1-bp@kernel.org
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When triggering a stack dump via sysrq (echo t > /proc/sysrq-trigger),
KASAN may report false-positive out-of-bounds access:
BUG: KASAN: out-of-bounds in __show_regs+0x4b/0x340
Call Trace:
dump_stack_lvl
print_address_description.constprop.0
print_report
__show_regs
show_trace_log_lvl
sched_show_task
show_state_filter
sysrq_handle_showstate
__handle_sysrq
write_sysrq_trigger
proc_reg_write
vfs_write
ksys_write
do_syscall_64
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe
The issue occurs as follows:
Task A (walk other tasks' stacks) Task B (running)
1. echo t > /proc/sysrq-trigger
show_trace_log_lvl
regs = unwind_get_entry_regs()
show_regs_if_on_stack(regs)
2. The stack value pointed by
`regs` keeps changing, and
so are the tags in its
KASAN shadow region.
__show_regs(regs)
regs->ax, regs->bx, ...
3. hit KASAN redzones, OOB
When task A walks task B's stack without suspending it, the continuous changes
in task B's stack (and corresponding KASAN shadow tags) may cause task A to
hit KASAN redzones when accessing obsolete values on the stack, resulting in
false positive reports.
Simply stopping the task before unwinding is not a viable fix, as it would
alter the state intended to inspect. This is especially true for diagnosing
misbehaving tasks (e.g., in a hard lockup), where stopping might fail or hide
the root cause by changing the call stack.
Therefore, fix this by disabling KASAN checks during asynchronous stack
unwinding, which is identified when the unwinding task does not match the
current task (task != current).
[ bp: Align arguments on function's opening brace. ]
Fixes: 3b3fa11bc700 ("x86/dumpstack: Print any pt_regs found on the stack")
Signed-off-by: Tengda Wu <wutengda@huaweicloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/all/20251023090632.269121-1-wutengda@huaweicloud.com
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When userspace is interrupted at the start of a function, before we
get a chance to complete the frame, unwind will miss one caller.
X86 has a uprobe specific fixup for this, add bits to the generic
unwinder to support this.
Suggested-by: Jens Remus <jremus@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251024145156.GM4068168@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net
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Perform mechanical conversion from DMA .map_page to .map_phys.
Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski@samsung.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251015-remove-map-page-v5-12-3bbfe3a25cdf@kernel.org
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Conflicts:
kernel/sched/ext.c
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Sean reported [1] the following splat when running KVM tests:
WARNING: CPU: 232 PID: 15391 at xfd_validate_state+0x65/0x70
Call Trace:
<TASK>
fpu__clear_user_states+0x9c/0x100
arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x142/0x210
exit_to_user_mode_loop+0x55/0x100
do_syscall_64+0x205/0x2c0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
Chao further identified [2] a reproducible scenario involving signal
delivery: a non-AMX task is preempted by an AMX-enabled task which
modifies the XFD MSR.
When the non-AMX task resumes and reloads XSTATE with init values,
a warning is triggered due to a mismatch between fpstate::xfd and the
CPU's current XFD state. fpu__clear_user_states() does not currently
re-synchronize the XFD state after such preemption.
Invoke xfd_update_state() which detects and corrects the mismatch if
there is a dynamic feature.
This also benefits the sigreturn path, as fpu__restore_sig() may call
fpu__clear_user_states() when the sigframe is inaccessible.
[ dhansen: minor changelog munging ]
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/aDCo_SczQOUaB2rS@google.com [1]
Fixes: 672365477ae8a ("x86/fpu: Update XFD state where required")
Reported-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Chang S. Bae <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
Tested-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/aDWbctO%2FRfTGiCg3@intel.com [2]
Cc:stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250610001700.4097-1-chang.seok.bae%40intel.com
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There's an issue with RDSEED's 16-bit and 32-bit register output
variants on Zen5 which return a random value of 0 "at a rate inconsistent
with randomness while incorrectly signaling success (CF=1)". Search the
web for AMD-SB-7055 for more detail.
Add a fix glue which checks microcode revisions.
[ bp: Add microcode revisions checking, rewrite. ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gregory Price <gourry@gourry.net>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251018024010.4112396-1-gourry@gourry.net
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Limit Entrysign sha256 signature checking to CPUs in the range Zen1-Zen5.
X86_BUG cannot be used here because the loading on the BSP happens way
too early, before the cpufeatures machinery has been set up.
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/all/20251023124629.5385-1-bp@kernel.org
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Pick up the below urgent upstream change in order to base more work
ontop:
- Correct the last Zen1 microcode revision for which Entrysign sha256 check is
needed
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
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Clang, in particular, is not happy about dead code:
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c:1830:20: error: unused function 'match_option' [-Werror,-Wunused-function]
1830 | static inline bool match_option(const char *arg, int arglen, const char *opt)
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~
1 error generated.
Remove a leftover from the previous cleanup.
Fixes: 02ac6cc8c5a1 ("x86/bugs: Simplify SSB cmdline parsing")
Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251024125959.1526277-1-andriy.shevchenko%40linux.intel.com
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