diff options
| author | Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> | 2025-12-04 13:59:16 +0100 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> | 2025-12-09 23:25:11 -0800 |
| commit | 189e5deb944a6f9c7992355d60bffd8ec2e54a9c (patch) | |
| tree | 67de59f86305b4bcc5d971b16f7f60119d9ec69d | |
| parent | d70f79fef65810faf64dbae1f3a1b5623cdb2345 (diff) | |
bpf, arm64: Do not audit capability check in do_jit()
Analogically to the x86 commit 881a9c9cb785 ("bpf: Do not audit
capability check in do_jit()"), change the capable() call to
ns_capable_noaudit() in order to avoid spurious SELinux denials in audit
log.
The commit log from that commit applies here as well:
"""
The failure of this check only results in a security mitigation being
applied, slightly affecting performance of the compiled BPF program. It
doesn't result in a failed syscall, an thus auditing a failed LSM
permission check for it is unwanted. For example with SELinux, it causes
a denial to be reported for confined processes running as root, which
tends to be flagged as a problem to be fixed in the policy. Yet
dontauditing or allowing CAP_SYS_ADMIN to the domain may not be
desirable, as it would allow/silence also other checks - either going
against the principle of least privilege or making debugging potentially
harder.
Fix it by changing it from capable() to ns_capable_noaudit(), which
instructs the LSMs to not audit the resulting denials.
"""
Fixes: f300769ead03 ("arm64: bpf: Only mitigate cBPF programs loaded by unprivileged users")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251204125916.441021-1-omosnace@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 2 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c b/arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c index 74dd29816f36..b6eb7a465ad2 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c +++ b/arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c @@ -1004,7 +1004,7 @@ static void __maybe_unused build_bhb_mitigation(struct jit_ctx *ctx) arm64_get_spectre_v2_state() == SPECTRE_VULNERABLE) return; - if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + if (ns_capable_noaudit(&init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return; if (supports_clearbhb(SCOPE_SYSTEM)) { |